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CHAPTER I
AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY
1.1 Basic Definitions
Conflict has been widespread throughout the whole of human history. When
two or more individuals have different values or goals, they will compete for control
over the events, and thus conflict appears. Game theory uses mathematics to study
such situations. Its study was greatly motivated in 1944 by the publication of
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by John Von Neumann and Oskar
Morgenstern [TCB09]. We begin with some basic definitions:
Definition 1.1 ([Sta99]). A game is said to be a situation or conflict between
individuals.
Definition 1.2. The participants in a game are called players.
While there are numerous types of games that model interactions between
individuals, we limit our discussion to 2-player games. In particular, we will focus
primarily on a 2-player game known as the Prisoner’s Dilemma. This game will be
discussed in detail in a section 1.2.
Just as when you sit down to play a board game with your friends, players in
a game must have a strategy to follow in order to win the game. In game theory, a
player is not said to win or lose the game, but rather a strategy can be successful or
unsuccessful toward a particular goal.
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Definition 1.3. In game theory, a strategy is a specification of what to do in any
given situation.
The success of a player’s strategy in a given game is measured by a payoff.
The payoff is equivalent to the score that a player earns in a particular game. The
payoff is often represented in a payoff matrix.
A very common two player game is Rock-Paper-Scissors. Consider two
players Ruth and Charlie. Saul Stahl [Sta99] gives an explicit description of this
childhood game:
Ruth and Charlie face each other and simultaneously display their hands
in one of the following three shapes: a fist denoting a rock, the forefinger
and middle finger extended and spread to as to suggest scissors, or a
downward facing palm denoting a sheet of paper. The rock wins over the
scissors since it can shatter them, the scissors win of the paper since
they can cut it, and the paper wins over the rock since it can be
wrapped around the latter.
The payoff matrix for Rock-Paper-Scissors game is shown in Table 1. For
each time the game is played, each player will earn either one point for winning, lose
one point for losing, or earn zero points in the case of a tie. The payoffs are
represented by ordered pairs. The first coordinate of the ordered pair is the payoff
for the row player (in this case, Ruth) and the second coordinate is the payoff of the
column player (Charlie). For example, in the first row and second column of the
payoff matrix we see the ordered pair (-1, 1), which is the payoff for when Ruth
plays rock and Charlie plays paper. The -1 in the ordered pair indicates that Ruth
earns a score of -1 because she loses when she plays rock against paper. Analogously,
the 1 in the ordered pair tells that Charlie earns 1 point because paper beats rock.
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Table 1. Payoff Matrix for Rock-Paper-Scissors: Here the ordered pair (-1,
1) in the rock row and the paper column indicates a payoff of -1 to Ruth and 1 to
Charlie provided that Ruth Played rock and Charlie played paper.
Charlie
Rock Paper Scissors
Rock (0,0) (-1, 1) (1, -1)
Ruth Paper (1, -1) (0, 0) (-1, 1)
Scissors (-1, 1) (1, -1) (0, 0)
Notice that the sum of each ordered pair in Table 1 is zero. This indicates
that Rock-Paper-Scissors is a zero-sum game. In a zero-sum game, one players win
is the other player’s loss. Not all games are zero-sum games. In nonzero-sum games,
the payoff may be a measurable amount as in zero-sum games or it may be
something abstract such as one-upmanship, which is a loss of face [Sta99].
1.2 Prisoner’s Dilemma
We discuss a particular nonzero-sum game, the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Definition 1.4. A nonzero-sum game is said to be non-cooperative if the players do
not communicate with each other about ways and methods to improve their payoff
[Sta99].
The Prisoner’s Dilemma game is a non-cooperative, nonzero-sum game. This
game was first given its name by a Princeton mathematician, Albert W Tucker, in
1950 [TCB09]. Consider the following scenario:
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Table 2. Payoff Matrix for Tucker’s Prisoner’s Scenario: Here the ordered
pair (-5, -5) in the Keep Quiet row and the Keep Quiet column indicates a payoff of
-5 to both prisoners, where the negative represents the length of the prison sentence.
Keep Quiet Testify
Keep Quiet (-5, -5) (-15, 0)
Testify (0, -15) (-10, -10)
You and a partner are arrested and held in connection with a certain
robbery. There is not enough evidence to convict you of armed robbery,
but the authorities separate you and your partner for questioning in
hopes that you will confess to the armed robbery. You have the choice to
testify against your partner for a reduced sentence or remain quiet.
Table 2 is the payoff matrix for the scenario. The payoff is in terms of the
length of the prison sentence, where the sentence is represented by a negative
integer. As described in the scenario, you have two choices: keep quiet (cooperate)
or testify (defect). No matter what your partner chooses, your payoff will be greater
if you choose to defect. However, overall, the payoff is better if both cooperate.
Hence, the dilemma!
We can study the interaction of persons who are not prisoners, and this can
still be modeled by a Prisoner’s Dilemma game similar to the scenario above. The
value of the payoff will be different depending on the specifics of the game.
Regardless of the actual values of the payoff, certain factors remain the same:
• There is a reward for mutual cooperation.
• There is a sucker’s payoff for the player who cooperates when the opponent
defects.
4
• There is a temptation to defect for the player who defects when the opponent
cooperates.
If you will only meet your opponent once in such a game, then it pays to take
advantage of the cooperation of your opponent and defect. However, you run the
risk of your opponent implementing the same strategy, and then both players will be
punished with a lesser payoff.
When two players engage with each other more than once in a row, and the
players are able to remember the previous moves of the other player, the game
becomes an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. While the overarching principles are the
same, a more complex strategy may be needed.
5
CHAPTER II
FIVE RULES FOR THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION
Martin A. Nowak proposes five rules for the evolution of cooperation: kin
selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and group
selection [Now06]. We discuss these in more detail below. In the subsequent
chapters, we then put more emphasis on the direct reciprocity.
As will be seen in later sections, Nowak gives a simple rule for each strategy
that designates whether natural selection can lead to cooperation. Each rule is
based on certain parameters. The two most important parameters are those of cost
and benefit. One who cooperates pays a certain cost so that another individual may
receive a benefit. A person who is a defector will have no cost and will not pay out
any benefits. Cost and benefit are measured for each individual involved in terms of
fitness. In a mixed population of defectors and cooperators, it is evident that
defectors will have a higher average fitness than cooperators because they pay out
no benefits to others. In a mixed society, the cooperators may fade from the picture
eventually, leading to a population of defectors. In pure, unmixed populations, the
population of cooperators has the highest average fitness, and the population of
defectors has the lowest. Thus, while it may benefit an individual to defect in a
mixed society, this defection will most likely lead to the eventual disappearance of
cooperators. Then, that society will no longer be mixed, and will be a society of
defectors, with the lowest level of fitness. This is not conducive for the evolution of
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the population. Therefore, cooperation is the preferable strategy for the
continuation of society.
2.1 Kin Selection
This first rule stems from the idea that natural selection will favor
cooperation if the individuals involved are genetic relatives. This rule of interaction
is known as Hamilton’s Rule. Hamilton’s rule takes into account a new parameter
called relatedness. Relatedness is the probability of sharing a gene. For example, the
probability that two brothers share a gene is 1
2
and the probability of two cousins
sharing a gene is 1
8
. So, we see that this rule is motivated by "selfish genes" that
wish to propel themselves [Daw16]. In order for individuals to cooperate with this
strategy, the relatedness must be greater than the cost-to-benefit ratio of the one
paying the benefit. Thus, natural selection will tend toward cooperation with this
rule:
r >
c
b
(2.1)
where r is the relatedness, c is the cost of the cooperation and b is the benefit of
cooperation.
2.2 Direct Reciprocity
Kin selection applies only to interaction of relatives. While it is a viable rule
for the evolution of cooperation in such a population of relatives, it is not sufficient
to only consider such relationships. Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for the
evolution of cooperation among individuals who are not related. This mechanism
works best in a scenario of repeated encounters between two individuals, where each
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individual has the choice to cooperate or defect, otherwise known as the Prisoner’s
Dilemma as discussed in Section 3.1. In Axelrod’s computer tournaments simulating
such games of interaction, he found that a strategy of direct reciprocity called TFT
was the best strategy [Axe84]. TFT always begins with cooperation, and then it
does whatever the other player did in the previous round. Simple though it is, this
strategy came out on top for both of Axelrod’s tournaments. No strategy is perfect,
and so TFT has its own weaknesses. TIT FOR TAT cannot correct any mistakes.
For example, if the other player accidentally defects, this may lead to a long line of
retaliation from the player using the TFT strategy. A slight variation of TFT, the
GENEROUS TIT FOR TAT strategy allows the player to cooperate sometimes
following a defection. This idea of forgiveness is crucial to move toward cooperation.
In time, TFT was replaced by an even simpler rule of engagement, WIN-STAY,
LOSE-SHIFT. This rule says that you will repeat your previous move when you are
"winning," but you will change your move otherwise. With these two rules of direct
reciprocity, TFT is still effective at leading toward cooperation in a society where
most individuals are defectors. However, once cooperation is established, the best
rule to follow is WIN-STAY, LOSE-SHIFT.
Regardless of the actual strategy being used, direct reciprocity may lead
natural selection to the evolution of cooperation if the probability of another
encounter with the same two individuals is high enough. This probability is denoted
by w. Again, this probability must exceed the cost-to-benefit ratio. Natural
selection will favor cooperation with the rule:
w >
c
b
(2.2)
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2.3 Indirect Reciprocity
Direct reciprocity is a good rule to follow when there are repeated
interactions among the same individuals. However, it is more likely for interactions
among people to be fleeting. In direct reciprocity, both individuals must be able to
provide help. With indirect reciprocity, one person is in a position to help another
individual, but the individual receiving the benefit has not opportunity to
reciprocate the act. This can be seen in society in our donations to charities. The
fuel behind indirect reciprocity is reputation. When one person helps another, it
establishes a good reputation for the donor. This good reputation is noted by others
in the population, and it may be rewarded by others. As a result, individuals will
tend toward cooperation if the probability of knowing someone’s probability is good
enough. The probability of knowing one’s reputation is denoted by q. This rule
seems like a selfishly motivated rule of operation, and in fact it is. Indirect
reciprocity will only promote the evolution of cooperation if the following rule is
satisfied:
q >
c
b
(2.3)
2.4 Network Reciprocity
The argument has been made that natural selection will tend toward
defection in a mixed population [Now06]. This conclusion is based on the idea that
everyone in the population interacts equally with every other member in the society.
While this is possible, it is not likely to happen in human populations. Most
populations are not well-mixed. This leads to another evolutionary approach to
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analyzing these interactions–evolutionary graph theory. In this approach, the
individuals in a society are represented by the vertices of the graph. The edges
represent the interactions with others. In the simplest of terms with cooperators
and defectors, we see that cooperators pay a cost for the neighbor to receive a
benefit. Defectors pay no cost and their neighbors receive no benefits. In these
terms, cooperators will form network clusters, and so cooperation prevails. This is
network reciprocity. Network reciprocity introduces another parameter into the
equation, and that is the average number of neighbors that an individual has. The
average number of neighbors is called k. For natural selection to lead to
cooperation, the benefit-to-cost ratio must be greater than the average number of
neighbors. Hence, we see cooperation with this simple rule:
b
c
> k (2.4)
2.5 Group Selection
Thus far, we have viewed natural selection as it acts upon individuals. In
turn, the individuals shape society. Selection also acts on groups as a whole. This
method for the evolution of cooperation uses a simple model of society divided in
different groups. Cooperators will help others in their group. Defectors help no one.
An individual reproduces proportional to their payoff. Offspring are added to the
same group. Groups may split in two if the population of the group reaches a
certain size. As a result of the creation of this new group, another group will
become extinct to limit the total population size. As a result, there is competition
between groups because certain groups grow faster than others, and thus split more
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often. As a general rule, pure cooperator groups grow faster than pure defector
groups. In mixed groups, individuals who defect will increase faster than
cooperators. This may eventually lead to the group becoming pure defectors. Using
this simple model, letting n be the maximum group size and m is the number of
groups, we find another simple rule for the evolution of cooperation:
b
c
> 1 +
n
m
(2.5)
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CHAPTER III
AXELROD’S ORIGINAL TOURNAMENT
3.1 Background to Axelrod’s Tournament
Interactions among individuals–whether the individuals are cells, animals, or
humans–occur all the time. These relationships have been studied across many
disciplines. In Prisoner’s Dilemma game, these individuals have two choices:
cooperate or defect. The innate tendencies of individuals are to be selfish. This
selfishness may lead to cooperation or defection depending on the payoff to the
individual. Studies have indicated that cooperation leads to the better payoff for all
involved over time [Axe84,Now06]. From an evolutionary perspective, cooperation is
imperative if the natural evolution process will construct new levels of organization
[Now06]. While all societies are based on cooperation, human society is the one
society that engages in the most complex games of interaction. In the lens of
natural selection, competition is the leader in motivation for behaviors, and this
competition naturally opposes cooperation. Nevertheless, it holds true that
cooperation is necessary to construct the new levels of organization in society, and
so there must be some strategies that will push individuals to cooperation.
In 1980, Robert Axelrod implemented a project that stemmed from one
simple question: When should a person cooperate or be selfish in an ongoing
interaction with another person? This type of situation can be represented by an
iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
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Many real life situations may be modeled by such a game, and Axelrod set
out to determine the best strategy to use in such situations. He invited experts in
game theory to submit programs for a computer Prisoner’s Dilemma tournament.
Fourteen entries were sent in as contenders in Axelrod’s computer tournament. In
the first tournament, he ran the fourteen entries and a random rule against each
other and determined a winner. After the initial tournament, the results were
circulated and another tournament took place. The same strategy surfaced as the
winner again. The winner for both tournaments was a program called TIT FOR
TAT (TFT), which is a strategy that begins with cooperation, and thereafter
returns what the other player did on the previous move. The specifics of the
tournament are discussed in the following section.
3.2 The Computer Tournament
Axelrod’s computer Prisoner’s Dilemma tournament set out to determine
how to choose effectively in an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma situation. His
tournament was set up as a round robin, where each entry was paired with each
other entry. Each entry was also paired with its twin and with RANDOM, which
was a strategy that chose randomly to cooperate or defect with equal probability.
Each game involved 200 moves. The payoffs were as follows:
• Mutual cooperation resulted in both players earning the reward of 3 points.
• Mutual defection resulted in both players earning the punishment of 1 point
each.
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Table 3. Payoff Matrix for Axelrod’s Tournament: Here the ordered pair (3,
3) in the Cooperate row and the Cooperate column indicates a payoff of 3 to both
players.
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate (3, 3) (0, 5)
Defect (5, 0) (1, 1)
• If one player cooperated and the other defected, the one who cooperated
would earn 0 points – known as the sucker’s payoff, while the one who
defected would earn 5 points – known as the temptation to defect.
TFT was the simplest of all the programs submitted to the tournament, and
it proved to be the best overall. In a second tournament, other entries were
submitted that were based upon TFT, but even with their attempts to improve it,
TFT still won. However, all of the strategies that were top runners in the
tournament had something in common with TFT. The best strategies share the
property of being nice. A strategy is nice if it is never the first to defect, or to say it
will not be the first to defect before the last few moves. See Table 4 for the results
from the first tournament.
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Table 4. Tournament Results: First Tournament: Here the number 214 in the Joss row and the Tideman
indicates Joss’s score when playing a game with 200 moves against Tideman. Other numbers are to be interpreted
similarly.
Strategy TFT Tideman Nydegger Grofman Shubik Stein & Rap Friedman Davis Graaskamp Downing Feld Joss Tullock Unnamed Random Average Score
TFT 600 595 600 600 600 595 600 600 597 597 280 225 279 359 441 504
Tideman 600 596 600 601 600 596 600 600 30 601 271 213 291 455 573 500
Nydegger 600 595 600 600 600 595 600 600 433 158 354 374 347 368 464 486
Grofman 600 595 600 600 600 594 600 600 376 309 280 236 305 426 507 482
Shubik 600 595 600 600 600 595 600 600 348 271 274 272 265 448 543 481
Stein & Rap 600 596 600 602 600 596 600 600 319 200 252 249 280 480 592 478
Friedman 600 595 600 600 600 595 600 600 307 207 235 213 263 489 598 473
Davis 600 595 600 600 600 595 600 600 307 194 238 247 253 450 598 472
Graaskamp 597 305 462 375 348 314 302 302 588 625 268 238 274 466 548 401
Downing 597 591 398 289 261 215 202 239 555 202 436 540 243 487 604 391
Feld 285 272 426 286 297 255 235 239 274 704 246 236 272 420 467 328
Joss 230 214 409 237 286 254 213 252 244 634 236 224 273 390 469 304
Tullock 284 287 415 293 318 271 243 229 278 193 271 260 273 416 478 301
Unnamed 362 231 397 273 230 149 133 173 187 133 317 366 345 413 526 282
Random 442 142 407 313 219 141 108 137 189 102 360 416 419 300 450 276
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Each of the top eight rules in the tournament were nice rules. The factor
that sets apart the top eight entries was their interaction with strategies that were
not nice. There were two strategies called kingmakers that made the biggest
difference among the top eight entries in the tournament.
DOWNING is the most important kingmaker. It focuses on "outcome
maximization" [Axe84]. The reasoning behind DOWNING is very different from
that of TFT. It is based on understanding what the other player will decide to do.
If the other player seems responsive to the choices that DOWNING makes, then
DOWNING will cooperate. On the other hand, if the other player does not seem to
be responsive to DOWNING’s choices, then it will lean toward the advantage that
comes from defecting. To make these decisions about the responsiveness of the other
player, DOWNING estimates two different conditional probabilities: the probability
that the other will cooperate given that DOWNING cooperates, and the probability
that the other will cooperate given that DOWNING defects. It then chooses the
probability that will maximize the long term payoff. Since DOWNING has no
conditional probabilities to begin with, it begins with an initial assumption that the
other player will be unresponsive. This forces it to defect for the first two moves.
Depending on the other strategy, DOWNING could be doomed to punish itself, or
against certain opponents, such as TFT, it learns to be cooperative. In our
recreation of the tournament, this error is corrected, and we implement a revised
version of DOWNING that does not defect on the first two moves, but rather it
begins with the assumption that the opponent will be responsive.
Another important factor in the success of a nice rule is the idea of
forgiveness. Forgiveness is the idea of cooperating following a defection by the other
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player. The nice rules that were least forgiving did not do as well as TFT. One such
entry that was lacking in forgiveness was FRIEDMAN. FRIEDMAN is a totally
unforgiving rule that uses permanent retaliation. It will never be the first to defect,
but once the other player defects, it will defect every time. In comparison to the
winner, TFT is unforgiving for one move, but then it is totally forgiving of that
defection.
While TFT reigned supreme in the tournament, there do exist certain
strategies that were not in the tournament that could have won had they entered
[Axe84].
TIT FOR TWO TATS is a strategy that defects only if the other player had
defected on the two previous turns. This makes it more forgiving than TFT, and it
proves that being more forgiving contributes to a higher payoff.
LOOK AHEAD was used in Axelrod’s preliminary tournament, and was the
winner of that preliminary. LOOK AHEAD is a rule that is inspired by techniques
used in artificial intelligence programs in playing chess.
There is one unlikely contender for the top spot in the tournament, and that
is a slight variation on DOWNING. If it had begun with an initial assumption that
the other player would be responsive instead of unresponsive, then DOWNING
could have been a winner of the tournament. However, as it is, DOWNING is a
pessimistic rule, and it therefore suffers the consequences.
In the second round of the tournament, there were strategies that used a
controlled number of defections. These "not nice" strategies were big indicators in
the level of success of the nice strategies. Two such strategies were TESTER and
TRANQUILIZER. TESTER is written to exploit the other player. It always defects
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for the first move. If the other player ever defects, TESTER apologizes by
cooperating for the next move, and then plays TFT for the remaining moves of the
game. Otherwise, it cooperates on the second and third moves and then defects for
every move afterward. As a result, TESTER does not score well, but it does do a
good job at exploiting some of the nicer rules.
TRANQUILIZER is a rule that is somewhat sneaky. Initially, it tries to
establish a mutually rewarding relationship. Once the rewarding relationship has
been established, it will try to exploit the other player. TRANQUILIZER will
cooperate for the first couple dozen moves as long as the other player is cooperating.
Then, it will attempt an unprovoked defection. TRANQUILIZER will never defect
twice in a row, and it will not defect more than one-fourth of the time.
While it was shown that TFT was the winner of Axelrod’s two computer
tournaments, that does not guarantee that it is the best strategy to employ in every
situation. Through strong testing including hypothetical tournaments, TFT proved
itself to be the winner again. Also, through ecological tests, TIT FOR TAT
remained at the top of the list. Consequently, it can be said that TFT is a robust
strategy. That is, it would be successful in a wide variety of environments. The
reasons for TFT’s robust nature stem from its combination of niceness, forgiveness,
retaliation, and clarity. Clarity allows the other player to recognize it for what it is,
and appreciate its behavior and lack of exploitability.
3.3 The Collective Stability of TFT
Axelrod’s computer tournament indicated that TFT would thrive as a
strategy. It follows that eventually all players might adopt the strategy. If this
happened, would there ever be a need to use an alternative strategy? If an
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alternative rule is able to infiltrate a population using a single strategy, and it is
able to score higher than the population average, then that alternative rule is said
to have invaded the population. If a particular strategy cannot be invaded, it is said
to be collectively stable. Thus arises the question of the stability of TFT. Axelrod
states a proposition about the collective stability of TFT.
Proposition 3.1 ([Axe84]). TIT FOR TAT is collectively stable if and only if the
probability of the game ending is small enough.
The current move in a game always carries more weight than a future move
because there is no guarantee of a future move. Now, we are faced with deciding
what is "small enough." Axelrod discovered that if the probability to end is 1
3
or
smaller, then TFT is collectively stable. If the probability grows to over 1
2
, then
TFT is no longer stable, and it would be best to defect every move [Axe84].
Through analysis of Axelrod’s tournament, there are four suggestions for how
to do well in an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma:
(1) Don’t be envious (Forgive).
(2) Don’t be the first to defect (Be nice).
(3) Reciprocate both cooperation and defection (Retaliate).
(4) Don’t be too clever (Have clarity).
It is clear that TFT abides by all four of those guidelines, and so it is easy to
see why it is such an effective strategy. Therefore, implementation of a strategy
similar to TFT can lead to the evolution of cooperation in a population.
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3.4 Live-and-Let-Live in WWI
During World War I, along the Western front in Europe, a level of
cooperation emerged among members of opposing armies. Trench warfare was very
common, and along the Western front there were many gruesome battles. However,
in between battles, a philosophy developed among the soldiers. Soldiers in opposing
armies could be clearly seen walking within shooting distance behind their
respective lines, yet no one was shot. The men in those trenches had adopted a
"live-and-let-live" philosophy. This policy among soldiers thrived, despite all the
efforts of Senior officers. The idea of "live-and-let-live" contradicts military logic.
The cooperation between enemies persisted when it should have never existed in the
first place.
While it may not appear to be as such, the interaction between two small
units in a quiet section along the Western front is a Prisoner’s Dilemma. Each unit
is a player and the choices in the game are to shoot to kill or to shoot in a manner
that does not inflict damage. The dilemma stems from the fact that if a major
battle should arise, one army would want the enemy’s army to be weakened prior to
battle. Thus, when looking at the short term goals, it may be wise to shoot to kill
whether the enemy is returning fire or not. This leads to the idea that mutual
deflection may be ideal in the short term. This mutual deflection is better for an
army than unilateral restraint, unless it is the opponent’s army that restrains
[Axe84]. As a result, both sides would prefer mutual restraint to random acts of
aggression between the units.
The different units interacted with each other for extended periods of time.
So, just as in the earlier discussion of interaction among players, while defection
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may benefit a player in the short term, strategies develop for interaction over an
extended period of time. What we have here is the evolution of cooperation between
the players. The choices and behaviors of the units in the trenches in World War I
support the expected outcomes from game theory. Just as TFT was a successful
strategy that implemented cooperation that was based upon reciprocity, the
"live-and-let-live" strategy operates in the same manner. Both sides would mutually
restrain themselves and keep from shooting to kill. If there was a defection, and one
army caused the death of some soldiers, then the opposing army would retaliate
causing damage that was comparable or sometimes slightly more devastating. Then,
the two armies would slip back into a state of cooperation.
Where did such cooperation first develop among enemies? The early battles
of World War I were very mobile and very destructive. As time progressed, the
enemy lines stabilized. The result was trenches along the front lines for opposing
armies with an empty "no man’s land" in between the front lines. According to
diary entries of soldiers, the cooperation developed quite spontaneously in many
different places along the Western front. The initial cases of such cooperation are
connected with common meal times. It became obvious to the soldiers in the
trenches that the enemies across the way must have been partaking in a similar
routine at the same time because things were quiet on both sides. Eventually,
communication began between the units, and truces were made. One such famous
verbal truce was the Christmas truce during the first Christmas in the trenches.
However, such verbal truces were quickly and easily punished. Other factors, such
as inclement weather contributed to the evolution of cooperation among enemies.
Certain weather conditions made it impossible to shoot at each other. If that
21
condition lasted long enough, then the cooperation sometimes continued after the
weather cleared. Ultimately, the biggest contributor to the development of the
"live-and-let-live" mentality was the idea of self-preservation. Soldiers knew that
their enemies shared the same needs as they did. The armies learned that a
unilateral attack would just result in retaliation from the other side. However,
restraint on one side would most likely result in restraint on the other side. Then
everyone involved would be able to live to fight another day.
Once started, the cooperation among enemies could easily spread from troop
to troop, down the line. One reason that cooperation was so sustainable was
because opposing armies made it clearly known that they could retaliate if
necessary. In a sense, each army would "flex their muscles" in an attempt to prove
that they were a worthy opponent that should not be reckoned with. The strategy
of "live-and-let-live" continued on in the trenches even as battalions would change
out since the soldiers moving out of the trench were familiar with the soldiers
moving in the trench. The agreements and policies would be passed along like a
legacy to the new soldiers who would occupy the front lines.
The "live-and-let-live" policy could not last forever (else, we would still be in
World War I). Military officials instituted a type of attack known as the raid. A raid
was a carefully planned attack on an enemy’s trench. A successful raid would collect
prisoners, while an unsuccessful raid would collect bodies. Either way, there would
be evidence of an attack. Unlike when soldiers could pretend to shoot to kill, when
in fact they were shooting to avoid inflicting damage, soldiers could not pretend to
implement a raid. Thus, this new strategy quickly brought an end to the
camaraderie in the trenches.
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When examining the "live-and-let-live" strategy, cooperation did not evolve
through blind mutation or survival of the fittest. This strategy developed as the
result of conscious decisions made by the players to cooperate on the basis of
reciprocation [Axe84]. The strategy did not thrive because of survival of the fittest
because even with a poor strategy in place, soldiers could easily be replaced, and
the unit would still remain in its location in the trenches. The surviving presence of
the players on both sides had nothing to do with the particular strategies
implemented by those on the front lines.
The "live-and-let-live" strategy follows the theory of the evolution of
cooperation, but there are two new developments that arise from this particular
method: ethics and ritual. In time, the interactions between the two opposing units
led to the development of concern for the fellow human being. Soldiers did not want
to violate an agreement of trust, nor did they want to see another person hurt.
Through extended interaction, the values and payoffs changed for the players. After
persistent cooperation, the payoff for this mutual cooperation became higher than it
initially was for the units. The raids brought out more ethics among the players. A
soldier feels an obligation to retaliate for a fallen comrade, and so revenge resulted
from the raids. Revenge drove soldiers to retaliate.
The other development that follows from "live-and-let-live" is the
development of rituals. What is meant by rituals in the trenches? Since both sides
agreed not to shoot to kill, the use of artillery was limited and used in a manner
that would be less than effective. Additionally, the smaller arms were used more
often in warfare. Also, different armies would follow a regular schedule when
attacking targets. This allowed the opposing army to know when and where the
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attack would take place so that the army could protect its soldiers and equipment
from such an attack. Another purpose for the rituals was to satisfy the higher
military authorities. Such attacks appeared to be aggressive acts of war, and so the
superiors were satisfied. However, with such precision and regularity, the attacks
were a beacon of peace to the enemy army on the other side.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS OF OUR COMPUTER TOURNAMENT
In the Appendix A, we include our Matlab code for the recreation of
Axelrod’s computer tournament. We have written two different programs: one that
replicates the computer tournament, and one that analyzes the results from the
tournament. The code for the actual computer tournament is modified from a file
written by Mark Broom and Jan Rychtář [BR13]. The descriptions for the
strategies originate from The Axelrod Library [KCH+17]. Dr. Jan Rychtář and Dr.
Sebastian Pauli contributed to the writing and revision of these programs.
In Section A.1 we include the code that is a recreation of Axelrod’s original
computer tournament. The code includes all fourteen of the original entries in the
tournament, as well as the RANDOM strategy. Our computer tournament is a
round robin tournament, where each game consists of 200 moves. In the program,
you are given the option to determine how many times you wish to play the
tournament. We played the tournament 1,000 times.
There are some slight variations in our code from the original computer
tournament. The most notable change is to the DOWNING strategy. In our code,
we write a revised DOWNING strategy. In the original strategy, DOWNING was a
pessimistic strategy that assumed that its opponent would not be cooperative.
Because of this fact, DOWNING did not perform well in the first computer
tournament. In Table 4, we see that DOWNING came in tenth place overall.
Axelrod suggested that if DOWNING initially assumed that its opponent was
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cooperative, then it could potentially be the winner of the computer tournament
[Axe84]. We followed this suggestion and made the appropriate adjustments to our
DOWNING rule.
Section A.2 includes the code used to perform data analysis on the
computer tournaments that were played using the code in Section A.1. The code
produces three different spreadsheets: best, worst, and average. The best
spreadsheet displays the best scores earned against each opponent in each of the
1,000 tournaments. It also includes the best average score that was attained by each
strategy in the tournament. In addition, the best spreadsheet gives the best overall
ranking for each strategy. This is useful because it allows us to easily see how the
strategies ranked against each other. Similarly, the worst and average spreadsheets
give the worst scores and average scores, respectively.
The results from our computer tournament differ from Axelrod’s tournament
in several ways. TFT did not do as well in our tournament. In Table 5 we see that
the best that TFT ranked in any of the 1,000 tournaments was second place. TFT
even did as poorly as ninth place, and on average TFT ranked at about 6.7 out of
15. TFT’s lack of success in our computer tournament may be attributed to a
couple of factors. Several of the competing strategies make decisions about
cooperation and defection at some given probability. That element of chance can
greatly affect the outcome when playing a game versus TFT. In effect, one could
argue that TFT was simply lucky in Axelrod’s two computer tournaments. To be
more accurate, TFT’s success in Axelrod’s first tournament is due largely in part to
the kingmakers [RSC15]. DOWNING was a major kingmaker in the original
tournament, and with the newly revised DOWNING, this characteristic is changed.
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Table 5. Best Results: Here the number 594 in the Downing row and the Stein column means that out of all
1,000 runs of the tournament, the best score that Downing achieved while playing against Stein was 594 points.
Also, the best average score that Downing earned in all 1,000 tournaments was 548.7 and the best ranking was 1.
Other numbers are to be interpreted similarly.
TFT Tideman Nydegger Grofman Shubik Stein Grim Davis Graaskamp Downing Feld Joss Tullock Unnamed Random Average Order
TFT 600 600 600 600 600 595 600 600 525 600 244 210 561 469 490 518.1 2
Tideman 600 600 600 600 600 595 600 600 596 600 260 211 565 568 616 535.9 1
Nydegger 600 600 600 600 600 594 600 600 582 600 378 108 579 312 377 503.5 5
Grofman 600 600 600 600 600 595 600 600 650 600 373 172 559 422 505 523.3 2
Shubik 600 600 600 600 600 595 600 600 740 600 260 217 410 560 630 532.6 1
Stein 600 600 604 604 600 596 600 600 522 604 239 210 588 605 655 536.1 1
Grim 600 600 600 600 600 595 600 600 303 600 235 207 373 599 693 507.9 4
Davis 600 600 600 600 600 595 600 600 303 600 231 209 371 580 681 509.3 4
Graaskamp 525 586 656 614 551 522 303 303 610 658 349 146 574 559 629 478.5 10
Downing 600 600 600 600 600 594 600 600 588 600 393 209 582 593 674 548.7 1
Feld 249 296 840 621 302 244 235 236 669 798 227 209 281 535 589 399 11
Joss 215 284 984 680 282 222 210 238 744 257 212 209 267 617 677 389.5 11
Tullock 566 560 668 611 430 578 363 351 632 666 249 206 468 487 529 410.6 11
Unnamed 469 405 880 631 280 429 156 177 705 589 325 195 436 492 564 384.5 11
Random 495 472 848 617 269 485 141 154 679 802 353 183 474 454 554 379.8 13
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In Table 6, we see that DOWNING’s worst average score in our 1,000
tournaments was 511.8. In particular, the worst that DOWNING ever scored in a
game occurred when playing against JOSS, and DOWNING scored only 198 points.
Even so, the worst that DOWNING ever did in our tournament was fourth place. In
fact, DOWNING’s best average score in our computer tournaments was
approximately 549. The benchmark for success for a good strategy in a game with
200 moves is a score of 600. A score of 600 is achieved when both players cooperate
with each other on every move. The success of the revised DOWNING confirms
Axelrod’s assumption that DOWNING would become a contender for the top spot
in the tournament if it was altered to become more optimistic. With a slight
revision, DOWNING transforms from a tenth place kingmaker to a tournament
champion.
28
Table 6. Worst Results: Here the number 525 in the TFT row and the Graaskamp column means that out of
all 1,000 tournaments, the worst score that TFT achieved while playing against Graaskamp was 525 points. Also,
the worst average score that TFT earned in all 1,000 tournaments was 490.5 and the worst ranking was 9. Other
numbers are to be interepreted similarly.
TFT Tideman Nydegger Grofman Shubik Stein Grim Davis Graaskamp Downing Feld Joss Tullock Unnamed Random Average Order
TFT 600 600 600 600 600 595 600 600 525 600 203 201 224 348 402 490.5 9
Tideman 600 600 600 600 600 595 600 600 563 600 205 183 216 350 393 497 8
Nydegger 600 600 600 600 600 594 600 600 516 600 240 24 498 175 228 482.9 9
Grofman 600 600 600 600 600 594 600 600 557 600 239 92 390 254 336 497.5 8
Shubik 600 600 600 600 600 595 600 600 607 600 201 183 220 401 472 509.1 5
Stein 600 600 604 600 600 596 600 600 522 604 205 199 224 359 415 498.7 7
Grim 600 600 600 600 600 595 600 600 303 600 203 201 225 423 491 490.7 9
Davis 600 600 600 600 600 595 600 600 303 600 202 193 225 421 509 489.5 9
Graaskamp 525 555 612 465 324 522 303 303 527 608 224 77 378 244 300 432.3 10
Downing 600 600 600 600 600 594 600 600 513 600 199 198 501 357 297 511.8 4
Feld 208 264 748 523 263 210 207 221 566 214 203 201 225 389 441 347.1 14
Joss 206 271 928 587 271 210 205 228 652 205 204 201 234 413 494 368.2 13
Tullock 229 286 614 500 286 229 219 218 449 612 203 192 227 369 412 362.1 14
Unnamed 348 198 764 507 199 131 104 135 183 108 227 123 275 326 380 306.5 15
Random 402 186 732 465 186 114 82 111 174 89 236 102 304 296 370 289.5 15
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There were other strategies that were able to win the tournament at least
once in our computer simulations. SHUBIK and STEIN performed very well in our
computer tournament. In the original tournament, SHUBIK came in fifth place.
Table 7 shows that SHUBIK’s average ranking is approximately 2.3. At the worst,
SHUBIK matched its performance in Axelrod’s tournament and came in fifth.
Similarly, STEIN was much improved in our computer tournament. STEIN followed
SHUBIK in the original tournament with a ranking of sixth place. While STEIN
did earn a seventh place spot in its worst performance of the tournaments, it still
averaged about 3.7 out of 15. These results make both SHUBIK and STEIN good
candidates for rules in an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma situation. Both performed
better than TFT. Interestingly, both SHUBIK and STEIN are variations of TFT.
SHUBIK is less forgiving and more retaliatory than TFT. STEIN checks for a
random strategy, and takes advantage of the randomness of its opponent by
defecting. Otherwise, STEIN remains cooperative.
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Table 7. Average Results: Here the number 600 in the Grim row and the Davis column means that out of all
1,000 tournaments, the average score that Grim achieved while playing against Davis was 600 points. Also, the
average of all average scores that Grim earned in all 1,000 tournaments was 499.01 and the average ranking was
6.9. Other numbers are to be interpreted similarly.
TFT Tideman Nydegger Grofman Shubik Stein Grim Davis Graaskamp Downing Feld Joss Tullock Unnamed Random Average Order
TFT 600 600 600 600 600 595 600 600 525 600 217.267 201.627 305.983 407.344 448.491 500.0475 6.677
Tideman 600 600 600 600 600 595 600 600 582.904 600 233.815 190.774 281.798 459.635 544.971 512.5931 3.702
Nydegger 600 600 600 600 600 594 600 600 553.488 600 309.66 63.285 543.834 241.426 301.277 493.798 8.63
Grofman 600 600 600 600 600 594.752 600 600 597.345 600 299.99 130.661 466.991 346.2 407.719 509.5772 4.406
Shubik 600 600 600 600 600 595 600 600 668.951 600 233.754 190.7 267.094 477.017 545.918 518.5623 2.339
Stein 600 600 604 600.992 600 596 600 600 522 604 216.969 200.181 305.938 464.915 578.529 512.9016 3.663
Grim 600 600 600 600 600 595 600 600 303 600 214.528 201.59 256.508 517.536 597.048 499.014 6.982
Davis 600 600 600 600 600 595 600 600 303 600 216.894 196.182 258.406 507.554 584.78 497.4544 7.555
Graaskamp 525 572.664 631.008 552.655 433.976 522 303 303 572.492 631.04 288.057 111.395 486.103 397.015 549.596 458.6001 10
Downing 600 600 600 600 600 594 600 600 553.44 600 275.855 201.364 543.675 510.86 563.35 536.1696 1.046
Feld 222.267 278.13 793.56 574.435 278.509 222.059 216.078 223.874 616.992 560.29 210.563 201.542 242.265 459.681 518.614 374.5906 12.252
Joss 206.627 276.369 957.81 638.701 276.33 214.191 206.085 236.067 701.065 207.404 206.452 202.408 240.533 507.411 584.683 377.4757 12.236
Tullock 310.978 335.553 637.444 553.756 318.439 310.143 239.398 240.516 573.578 637.55 220.795 195.308 288.729 424.905 469.874 383.7977 11.575
Unnamed 410.259 277.5 835.126 567.935 230.187 261.94 126.091 155.544 437.115 144.345 276.596 151.901 364.315 407.291 479.608 341.7169 14.017
Random 451.011 228.601 795.157 548.954 226.833 150.579 106.988 135.135 220.476 184.845 288.034 138.048 403.059 380.643 449.197 313.8373 14.92
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The results from our computer tournament parallel those in Axelrod’s
tournament in numerous ways. On average, the nice strategies still ranked in the
top eight in our tournaments. A few of the nice strategies did slip into ninth place
for at least one of the tournaments, but this makes sense because DOWNING made
a big move from tenth place into the top four places. There is also a clear
distinction between the scores of the nice strategies in comparison to the scores of
the not nice strategies. The ranking of the remaining not nice rules performed
similarly in our tournaments as they did in Axelrod’s tournament. The RANDOM
and UNNAMED strategies still remained in the bottom two spots on average.
However, both of these strategies were able to improve slightly at least once in the
1,000 tournaments, with UNNAMED placing in eleventh place once and RANDOM
moving into thirteenth place. GRAASKAMP’s performance in our computer
tournament is comparable to the original tournament. Actually, GRAASKAMP’s
performance was the most consistent of all the strategies. In each of the 1,000
tournaments played, GRAASKAMP always came in tenth place. We can argue that
GRAASKAMP performed exactly the same in our computer tournament as it did in
the original tournament. While GRAASKAMP did slide back one position into
tenth place, we have to remember that DOWNING was much improved, and so
DOWNING’s improved performance should shift all the other players back.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
We have seen in Chapter II that there are several potential mechanisms for
the evolution of cooperation: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity,
and group selection. In this thesis, we have focused on direct reciprocity as
implemented in the repeated interactions between individuals. In an effort to better
understand the best rules to follow when in an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, we have
slightly modified Axelrod’s original computer tournament to simulate the evolution
of cooperation using Matlab. We have found that several strategies, most notably
DOWNING, STEIN and SHUBIK, did perform actually much better than what
Axelrod’s results suggested and, surprisingly, TFT performed worse than in the
tournament. At the same time, however, STEIN and SHUBIK are simply variations
of TFT. Thus, we can conclude, that in order to be successful in the iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma, the strategy should have the following characteristics:
• Forgive.
• Be nice.
• Retaliate.
• Be clear.
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APPENDIX A
A RECREATION OF AXELROD’S TOURNAMENT
A.1 Matlab Code for Tournament
1 function IPD_Tournament
2 % implementation of a round robin tournament of iterated PD game
3 % User specifies the PD payoff matrix
4 % User also specifies the list of strategies and their definition
5
6 %% User defined parameters
7 PD_payoff =[1,5;
8 0,3]; %payoff matrix for PD game
9
10
11 %%Init and auxiliar variables
12 strategy = {@TFT, @Tideman, @Nydegger, @Grofman, @Shubik, @Stein, ...
@Grim, @Davis, @Graaskamp, @Downing, @Feld, @Joss, @Tullock, ...
@Unnamed, @Random};% list of strategies
13 strategy_names = {'TFT', 'Tideman', 'Nydegger', 'Grofman', ...
'Shubik', 'Stein', 'Grim', 'Davis', 'Graaskamp', 'Downing', ...
'Feld', 'Joss', 'Tullock', 'Unnamed' 'Random'};
14
15
16 Defect = 1;
17 Cooperate = 2;
18 %with the above notation, PD_payoff(Defect, Cooperate)
19 %determines the payoff to a player that defected if the other
35
20 %cooperated
21 Nplayers = length(strategy); % how many players entered
22 score = zeros(1,Nplayers); % init of scores as 0
23
24 %% init counters for the strategies
25
26 % Shubik counters
27 Retaliation_Counter = 0; % init the count of retaliation
28 Moves_to_retaliate = 0; % not retaliating anymore
29
30 %Downing
31 C_count = 0; %count of my own cooperations
32 D_count = 0; %count of my own defections
33 DC_count = 0; %count of opponent cooperations after my defection
34 CC_count = 0; %count of opponent cooperations after my cooperation
35 good = 1; %probability opponent is responsive
36 bad = 0; %probability opponent is unresponsive
37
38 %Stein
39 Stein_move_counter = 0; %initialize the move counter
40 Opponent_is_random = 0; %assume opponent is not random
41
42 %Feld
43 probability_to_cooperate = 1;
44
45 %Tideman
46 opp_D_counter = 0; %initializ the opponent deflection counter
47 last_refresh_round = −20;
48
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49
50 %% User defined functions specifying strategies
51 % functions take my and opponent's history of the moves
52 % as an input and produce my move as an output
53
54 function move=TFT(My_hist, Opp_hist)
55 %Tit for Tat Strategy
56 %Always cooperates on the first move. After the first
57 %move, it reciprocates the opponent's last move.
58
59 if isempty(My_hist) % if first move
60 move=Cooperate; % cooperate on the first move
61 else % not first move
62 move=Opp_hist(end); % repeat opponent's last move
63 end;
64 end
65
66 function move=Grim(My_hist, Opp_hist)
67 %Grim Stategy
68 %This strategy was known as Grudger by Friedman in the
69 %Axelrod Tournament.
70 %This strategy will cooperate until the opponent defects.
71 %Then, it will always defect for all of the remaining moves.
72
73 if any(Opp_hist==Defect) % if opponent ever defected
74 move=Defect;
75 else
76 move=Cooperate;
77 end;
37
78 end
79
80 function move=Random(My_hist, Opp_hist)
81 %Random Strategy
82 %Cooperates and defects on a completely random basis, not
83 %dependent on the opponent's moves.
84
85 move = randi(2); %randomly choose between cooperate and
86 %defect
87 end
88
89 function move=Grofman(My_hist, Opp_hist)
90 %Grofman Strategy
91 %It cooperates on the first two moves, and then returns the
92 %opponent's moves for the next five moves (i.e. It
93 %cooperates on the first move and then plays TFT for moves
94 %2−6). For the remaining moves of the game, it cooperates if
95 %both it and the opponent made the same move in the previous
96 %round. Otherwise,it cooperates randomly with a probability
97 %of 2/7.
98
99 if isempty(My_hist) %if first move
100 move=Cooperate; %cooperate on first move
101 else %not first move
102 if (length(My_hist))<6 % moves 2 through 6
103 move=TFT(My_hist, Opp_hist);%play TFT for moves
104 %2 through 6
105 else %not moves 2−6
106 if My_hist(end)==Opp_hist(end) %if the previous
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107 %move is the same
108 %for both players
109 move=Cooperate; %Cooperate on the next move
110 else %if the previous move is not the same for
111 %both players
112 if rand()≤ 2/7
113 move=Cooperate; %cooperate randomly with
114 %prob 2/7
115 else %the other 5/7 of the time
116 move=Defect;%defect
117 end
118 end
119 end;
120 end;
121 end
122
123 function move=Davis(My_hist, Opp_hist)
124 %Davis Strategy
125 %Cooperates on the first 10 moves, then it plays
126 %Grim (Friedman) for the remaining moves of the game.
127
128 if length(My_hist)<10 %for the first 10 moves
129 move=Cooperate; %Cooperate on first 10 moves
130 else %after the first 10 moves
131 move=Grim(My_hist, Opp_hist); %Play Grim after first
132 %10 moves
133 end;
134 end
135
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136 function output = ISRANDOM(Opp_hist)
137 %takes a sequence of 1's and 2's and returns 1 if the
138 %sequence can be random
139
140 %This function will be used with the Graaskamp strategy
141 %below.
142
143 L = length(Opp_hist);
144 C_count_random = sum(Opp_hist)−L; %defect is 2, coop is 1
145 if ((C_count_random < (L/2 − ...
3*sqrt(L/4)))||(C_count_random > (L/2 + 3*sqrt(L/4))))
146 %takes the number of 1's and checks against binomial
147 %distribution; if outside of usual bounds, it is not
148 %random
149 output = 0;
150 else
151 %can be random
152 %check pairs
153
154 %initialize
155 CC_count_random = 0;
156 CD_count_random = 0;
157 DC_count_random = 0;
158 DD_count_random = 0;
159 for i = 1:L−1
160 pair = Opp_hist(i:i+1);
161 if pair == [1 1]
162 CC_count_random = CC_count_random +1;
163 elseif pair == [1 2]
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164 CD_count_random = CD_count_random +1;
165 elseif pair == [2 2]
166 DD_count_random = DD_count_random +1;
167 elseif pair == [2 1]
168 DC_count_random = DC_count_random +1;
169 end
170 end
171 %all counts should be roughly 1/4 of the L−1 pairs
172 % CC_count
173 % CD_count
174 % DC_count
175 % DD_count
176 % L
177 % L/4 − 3*sqrt(L*3/16)
178 % L/4 + 3*sqrt(L*3/16)
179 L=L−1; %here we have only L−1 pairs
180 if ((CC_count_random < (L/4 − ...
3*sqrt(L*3/16)))||(CC_count_random > (L/4 + ...
3*sqrt(L*3/16)))) ...
181 || ((CD_count_random < (L/4 − ...
3*sqrt(L*3/16)))||(CD_count_random > (L/4 ...
+ 3*sqrt(L*3/16)))) ...
182 || ((DC_count_random < (L/4 − ...
3*sqrt(L*3/16)))||(DC_count_random > (L/4 ...
+ 3*sqrt(L*3/16)))) ...
183 || ((DD_count_random < (L/4 − ...
3*sqrt(L*3/16)))||(DD_count_random > (L/4 ...
+ 3*sqrt(L*3/16))))
184 %distribution; if outside of usual bounds, it is
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185 %not random
186 output = 0;
187 else
188 output = 1;
189 end
190 end
191 end
192
193 function output = DO_I_KNOW_THIS_STRATEGY(My_hist, Opp_hist)
194
195 %compares the sequence of moves of the opponent to any
196 %known strategy (other than random), returns 1 if I know
197 %this strategy
198
199 %take all strategies we know
200 %strategy = {@TFT, @Grim, @Random, @Tester, @Grofman,
201 %@Davis, @Graaskamp, @Joss, @Tideman, @Nydegger, @Shubik,
202 %@Stein, @Downing, @Feld, @Tullock, @Unnamed};
203
204 %This function will be used within the Graaskamp strategy
205 %below.
206
207 known_deterministic_strategies = [1,7,8] ;
208
209 output = 0; %start with the hypothesis that I do not know
210 %the strategy
211 for str = known_deterministic_strategies
212 m=1; %start the hypothetical moves
213 %go all the way to the end of the history or to the
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214 %place where I deviate from TFT
215 while (m<length(Opp_hist)) && (Opp_hist(m) == ...
strategy{str}(Opp_hist(1:m−1), My_hist(1:m−1)))
216 m = m+1;
217 end
218 if m== length(Opp_hist) %if I got all the way to the
219 %end it means I played like
220 %TFT
221 output = 1; %it can be strategy that I know
222 end %there is no if, if I know it
223 %can be one, it could be the other, but I
224 %will never assign 0 to output once I test
225 %for a strategy
226 end
227 end
228
229 function move=Graaskamp(My_hist, Opp_hist)
230 % Graaskamp Strategy
231 % Plays TFT for 50 rounds, defects on round 51, plays TFT
232 %for rounds 52−56, a check is then made to see if the
233 %opponent is playing randomly, if so it defects for the
234 %rest of the rounds. The strategy also checks to see if
235 %the opponent is playing some other strategy that it
236 %recognizes. If so, it plays TFT for the remaining moves
237 %of the game.Otherwise, if the opponent is not is
238 %playing a recognizable strategy, it cooperates and
239 %randomly defects every 5 to 15 moves. The last bit will
240 %be addressed by randomly defecting with probability 0.1
241
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242 M = length(My_hist)+1; %denotes the current round
243 if M≤ 50 %for the first 50 rounds
244 move=TFT(My_hist, Opp_hist);%Play TFT for first 50 rounds
245 else
246 %50 or more moves were played
247 if M==51
248 move=Defect; %defect on 51st move
249 else %51 or more moves were played
250 if (51 < M) && (M < 57) %for moves 52−56 plays TFT
251 move=TFT(My_hist, Opp_hist); %play TFT for
252 %the next 5 moves
253 else %56 or more were played
254 if ISRANDOM(Opp_hist) %if opponent plays
255 %random strategy
256 move = Defect;
257 else %if opponent does not play a random strategy
258 if DO_I_KNOW_THIS_STRATEGY(My_hist, Opp_hist)
259 %if opponent's strategy is recognized
260 move = TFT(My_hist, Opp_hist);
261 else
262 %if opponent's stategy is not recognized
263 %we code it as defect randomly with
264 %probability 10%
265 if rand()≤0.1 %defect 10% of the time
266 move = Defect;
267 else %cooperate 90% of the time
268 move = Cooperate;
269 end;
270 end;
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271 end;
272 end;
273 end;
274 end;
275 end
276
277 function move=Joss(My_hist, Opp_hist)
278 %Joss Strategy
279 %Plays a variation of TFT; it always defects when the
280 %opponent defects, but it cooperates when the opponent
281 %cooperates with a probability of .9
282
283 if isempty(My_hist) %if first move
284 move=Cooperate;
285 else %if not first move
286 if Opp_hist(end)==Cooperate %if the opponent
287 %cooperated on last move
288 if 0.9 ≤ rand()
289 move=Cooperate; %cooperate with a probability
290 %of 0.9
291 else
292 move=Defect; %defect 10% of the time when the
293 %opponent cooperates
294 end;
295 else %if the opponent defected on the last move
296 move=Defect;
297 end;
298 end;
299 end
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300
301 function output = A_SCORE(My_hist, Opp_hist)
302 %Implements the function: A = 16a1 + 4a2 + a3
303 %a1 is the score from the previous round
304 %a2 is the score from 2 moves before
305 %a3 is the score from 3 moves before
306 %ai = 3 if both defect
307 %ai = 2 if only the opponent defects
308 %ai = 1 if only it defects
309 %ai = 0 if both cooperate
310
311 %%This function will be used within the Nydegger strategy
312 %below.
313
314 score_map =[3,1; %score map matrix
315 2,0];
316 %if both players defect, score 3 points
317 %if I defect and opponent cooperates, score 1 point
318 %if I cooperate and opponent defects, score 2 points
319 %if both players cooperate score 0 point
320
321 A_SCORE = 16*score_map(My_hist(end), Opp_hist(end)) + ...
4*score_map(My_hist(end − 1), Opp_hist(end−1)) + ...
score_map(My_hist(end − 2), Opp_hist(end−2));
322 %implement the score function
323 output = A_SCORE;
324 end
325
326 function move=Nydegger(My_hist, Opp_hist)
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327 %Nydegger Strategy
328 %Plays a variation of TFT for 3 rounds: if it is the only
329 %one to cooperate on first round, and only one to defect on
330 %second round, then then it defects on round 3. After first
331 %3 moves, the following moves are based on the previous 3
332 %rounds based on a score given by making a calculation:
333 %A = 16a1 + 4a2 + a3, where ai is the score for the
334 %previous ith round, ai = 3 if both strategies defect,
335 %ai=2 if only the opponent defects, and ai = 1 if only it
336 %defects. The strategy defects if and only if
337 %A = {1, 6, 7, 17, 22, 23, 26, 29, 30, 31, 33,38, 39, 45,
338 %49, 54, 55, 58, 61}
339
340 M = length(My_hist) + 1; %denotes the current round
341 if M ≤ 2 %for the first 2 moves
342 move = TFT(My_hist, Opp_hist);
343 else %if more than 2 moves have been played
344 if M==3 %on the third move
345 %if it is the only one to
346 %cooperate on first round, and only one to defect
347 %on second round, then it defects
348 if (My_hist(end−1) == Cooperate) && ...
(Opp_hist(end−1) == Defect) ...
349 && (My_hist(end) == Defect) && ...
(Opp_hist(end) == Cooperate)
350 move = Defect;
351 %I am the only one to cooperate in the first
352 %round and I am the only one to defect in
353 %the second round
47
354 else
355 move = Cooperate;
356 end;
357
358 else %if more than 3 moves are played
359 a = [ 1 6 7 17 22 23 26 29 30 31 33 38 39 45 49 ...
54 55 58 61];
360 %possible output values from the A Score function
361 if ismember(A_SCORE(My_hist, Opp_hist), a) == 1
362 %defect if the A Score is one of the scores in "a"
363 move = Defect;
364 else %if A_Score is not one of those values in "a"
365 move = Cooperate;
366 end
367 end
368 end
369 end
370
371 function move=Shubik(My_hist, Opp_hist)
372 %Shubik Strategy
373 %Plays a variation of TFT. It cooperates when the
374 %opponent cooperates, and it begins with a single
375 %defection if the opponent defects. But,the retaliation
376 %increases by 1 each time the opponent defects when it had
377 %cooperated on the previous round.
378
379 if isempty(My_hist) %if first move
380 move=Cooperate; %cooperate on first move
381 Retaliation_Counter = 0; % init the count of retaliation
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382 Moves_to_retaliate = 0; % not retaliating anymore
383
384 else %if not first move
385 if Moves_to_retaliate > 0
386 %if I am retaliating
387 %ignore opponent completely and defect
388 %this has to go for a total of
389 %Retaliation_Counter moves. It is done by
390 %an auxiliary counter Moves_to_retaliate that
391 %decreases by 1 every time we defect
392 move = Defect;
393 Moves_to_retaliate = Moves_to_retaliate − 1;
394 %decrease the number of moves I still have to
395 %retaliate
396 else %I am not retaliating
397 if (Opp_hist(end) == ...
Defect)&&(My_hist(end)==Cooperate)
398 %this means unprovoked defection
399 %I have to start retaliating
400 move = Defect;
401 Moves_to_retaliate = Retaliation_Counter;
402 %how many more moves I have to retaliate
403 Retaliation_Counter = Retaliation_Counter + 1;
404 %next time I will retaliate one move longer
405 else
406 move = Cooperate;
407 end;
408 end;
409 end;
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410 end
411
412 function move=Stein(My_hist, Opp_hist)
413 %Stein and Rapoport Strategy
414 %This strategy plays a modification of Tit For Tat
415 %Cooperates for first 4 moves, then plays TFT, checking
416 %every 15 moves to see if the opponent is playing randomly.
417 %If the opponent is playing randomly, it defects. Otherwise,
418 %it cooperates.
419 %It defects on last 2 moves.
420
421
422 M = length(My_hist) + 1; %denotes the current round
423 if M ≤ 4 %for the first 4 moves
424 move=Cooperate; %Cooperate for the first 4 moves
425 Stein_move_counter = 0; %initialize the move counter
426 Opponent_is_random = 0; %assume opponent is not random
427 else %if more than 4 moves have been played
428 if (4 < M) && (M < 199)
429 Stein_move_counter = Stein_move_counter +1;
430 %increase the move counter
431 if (Stein_move_counter ==15)
432 %every 15 moves, check if opponent
433 %is random
434 Opponent_is_random = ISRANDOM(Opp_hist);
435 Stein_move_counter = 0; %reset the counter
436 end
437 if Opponent_is_random == 1 %if my opponent is random
438 move = Defect;
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439 else %if my opponent is not random
440 move = TFT(My_hist, Opp_hist);
441 %play TFT for all rounds up
442 %until last 2 moves
443 end
444 end
445 end
446 if M ≥ 199 %for the last 2 moves
447 move = Defect;
448 end
449 end
450
451 function move=Downing(My_hist, Opp_hist)
452 %Revised Downing Strategy
453 %In the original tournament, Downing defected on the
454 %first two moves. This is corrected and we implement
455 %the Revised Downing strategy.
456
457 %It calculates conditional probability that the opponent
458 %will cooperate given that it defected and the conditional
459 %probability that the opponent will cooperate given that it
460 %cooperated. If the opponent seems unresponsive to what
461 %it is doing, it will defect as much as possible. If the
462 %opponent seems responsive, it cooperates. It uses these
463 %probabilities to estimate the opponent's next move. These
464 %probabilities are continuously updated and the strategy
465 %attempts to make moves that will maximize the score on
466 %the long term.
467
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468 if isempty(My_hist) %if first move
469 move = Cooperate; %cooperate on first move
470 %initialize counters
471 good = 1;
472 bad = 0;
473 C_count = 0; %count of my own cooperations
474 D_count = 0; %count of my own defections
475 DC_count = 0; %count of opponent cooperations after
476 %my defection
477 CC_count = 0; %count of opponent cooperations after
478 %my cooperation
479 else
480 if length(My_hist)<2 %if 2nd move
481 move = Cooperate; %cooperate on the 2nd move too
482 else %third move or more
483 if My_hist(end) == Defect %if I defected on the
484 %last move
485 D_count = D_count + 1; %increase the count
486 %of my defections
487 if Opp_hist(end) == Cooperate %if opponent
488 %cooperated
489 %despite my
490 %defection
491 DC_count = DC_count + 1;
492 end
493 bad = DC_count/D_count; %update the
494 %probability
495 %of the opponent
496 %cooperating despite
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497 %a defection
498 %This is the probability that the
499 %opponent is unresponsive.
500 else %if I cooperated
501 C_count = C_count + 1; %increase the count of
502 %my cooperations
503 if Opp_hist(end) == Cooperate %if the
504 %opponent
505 %cooperated
506 %following
507 %my cooperation
508 CC_count = CC_count + 1;
509 end
510 good = CC_count/C_count; %update the
511 %probability
512 %of the opponent
513 %cooperating following
514 %a cooperation
515 %This is the probability that the
516 %opponent is responsive.
517 end
518 %Next, make a decision based on the updated
519 %probabilities.
520 c = 6.0*good − 8.0*bad − 2;
521 alt = 4.0*good −5.0*bad − 1;
522
523 if c ≥ 0 && c ≥ alt %if opponent seems responsive
524 move= Cooperate;
525 else
53
526 if (c ≥ 0 && c < alt) || (alt ≥ 0)
527 move=3−My_hist(end); %do the opposite of
528 %my last move
529 else %if the opponent doesn't seem responsive
530 move = Defect;
531 end
532 end
533 end
534 end
535 end
536
537 function move=Feld(My_hist, Opp_hist)
538 %Feld Strategy
539 %Plays TFT in that it begins with a cooperation and
540 %defects every time the opponent defects, but it
541 %cooperates with a decreasing probability until it
542 %reaches 0.5. We decrease the probability each time by
543 %0.05
544
545 if isempty(My_hist) %if first move
546 move=Cooperate;
547 probability_to_cooperate = 1;
548 else %if not first move
549 if Opp_hist(end)==Defect %and it defected on the last
550 %move
551 move=Defect;
552 else %opponent cooperates
553 if probability_to_cooperate ≥ rand() %cooperate
554 %with a given
54
555 %probability
556 move=Cooperate;
557 else %defect the other 0.5 of the time
558 move=Defect;
559 end;
560 %decrease the probability to cooperate by 0.05
561 %but always keep it at least 0.5
562 probability_to_cooperate = max(0.5, ...
probability_to_cooperate−0.05);
563 end;
564 end;
565 end
566
567 function move=Tullock(My_hist, Opp_hist)
568 %Tullock Strategy
569 %Cooperates the first 11 rounds, and then randomly
570 %cooperates 10% less than the opponent cooperated
571 %in the previous 10 rounds
572
573 if length(My_hist) < 11 %if less than 11 rounds have been
574 %played
575 move=Cooperate;
576 else %if more than 11 rounds have been played
577 Opp_last_10_moves = Opp_hist(end−10+1:end); %get the
578 %last 10
579 %moves
580 prob_to_coop = ...
max(0,sum(Opp_last_10_moves==Cooperate)/10 − 0.1);
581 if rand()≤prob_to_coop
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582 move=Cooperate;
583 else
584 move = Defect;
585 end;
586 end;
587 end
588
589 function move=Unnamed(My_hist, Opp_hist)
590 %Unnamed Strategy
591 %It cooperates with a given probability P. This
592 %probability is initially 0.3. Then P is updated
593 %every 10 rounds based on whether the opponent
594 %seems very random, very cooperative, or very
595 %uncooperative. Also, after 130 rounds, P is adjusted
596 %if it is losing to the opponent.
597
598 %The original code is not available, and has been deemed
599 %"complicated" but based on public descriptions, it can
600 %be determined that this strategy cooperates with a random
601 %probability between 0.3 and 0.7
602
603 random_number=rand(); %generate random number
604 if 0.3<random_number && 0.7>random_number %for a
605 %probability
606 %between 0.3
607 %and 0.7
608 move=Cooperate;
609 else %in the other 0.3 to 0.7 of the time
610 move=Defect;
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611 end;
612 end
613
614 function score = get_score(My_hist, Opp_hist)
615 %returns my current total score in the IPD Game
616 %checks every round of the game, collects scores in that
617 %round and adds them up
618
619 %This function is used in the Tideman strategy below.
620
621 score = 0; %initialize the counter of the score
622 if isempty(My_hist)
623 score = 0;
624 else
625 for i=1:length(My_hist)
626 score = score + PD_payoff(My_hist(i), Opp_hist(i));
627 end
628 end
629 end
630
631 function move=Tideman(My_hist, Opp_hist)
632 %Tideman and Chieruzzi Strategy
633 %It plays the Shubik Strategy with a slight variation.
634 %The opponent is given a "fresh start" if certain criteria
635 %are met:
636 % 1. The opponent is 10 points behind this strategy
637 % 2. AND if the opponent has not just begun a run of
638 % defections
639 % 3. AND if it has been at least 20 rounds since the
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640 % last "fresh start"
641 % 4. AND there are 10 or more rounds left in the tournament
642 % 5. AND the total number of defections differs from a
643 % 50−50 random sample by at least 3.0 standard deviations.
644 %A "fresh start" is a sequence of 2 cooperations and an
645 %assumption that the game has just started (so all is
646 %forgotten)
647
648 last_refresh_round = −20; % init of the counter keeping
649 %track of last refreshing, has
650 %to be −20 to make sure we can
651 %refresh soon if needed
652
653 if isempty(My_hist) %if first move
654 move=Cooperate; %cooperate on first move
655 Retaliation_Counter = 0; % init the count of retaliation
656 Moves_to_retaliate = 0; % not retaliating anymore
657
658 else %if not first move
659 %check if I should restart the counter
660 % 1. The opponent is 10 points behind this strategy
661 % 2. AND if the opponent has not just begun a run
662 % of defections
663 % 3. AND if it has been at least 20 rounds since
664 % the last "fresh start"
665 % 4. AND there are 10 or more rounds left in the
666 % tournament
667 % 5. AND the total number of defections differs
668 % from a 50−50 random sample by at least 3.0
58
669 % standard deviations.
670 %get the scores
671 My_score = get_score(My_hist, Opp_hist); % get the
672 %score for
673 %me based on
674 %the history
675 Opp_score = get_score(Opp_hist, My_hist); %get the
676 %score for
677 %me based on
678 %the history
679 current_round = length(My_hist)+1; %round number to
680 %be played
681 n = length(My_hist); %number of rounds already played
682 opp_D_counter = sum(Opp_hist==Defect); %count of
683 %opponent's
684 %defection so far
685 if (My_score − Opp_score ≥ 10) ...
686 && (Opp_hist(end)==Cooperate) ...
687 && (current_round−last_refresh_round≥ 20) ...
688 && (current_round ≤ 190) ...
689 && ((opp_D_counter < (n/2 − ...
3*sqrt(n/4)))||(opp_D_counter > (n/2 + ...
3*sqrt(n/4))))
690 %now I can give a fresh start
691 Retaliation_Counter = 0; % init the count of
692 %retaliation
693 Moves_to_retaliate = 0; % not retaliating anymore
694 last_refresh_round = current_round; % I just
695 %refreshed,
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696 %so I need to
697 %store the info
698 move = Cooperate;
699 else
700 %I did not give a fresh start, so I am doing Shubik
701 %I can't call Shubik because of internal counting
702 %in this procedure
703 if Moves_to_retaliate > 0
704 %if I am retaliating
705 %ignore opponent completely and defect
706 %this has to go for a total of
707 %Retaliation_Counter moves. It is done by
708 %an auxiliary counter Moves_to_retaliate that
709 %decreases by 1 every time we defect
710 move = Defect;
711 Moves_to_retaliate = Moves_to_retaliate − 1;
712 %decrease the number of moves I still have
713 %to retaliate
714 else %I am not retaliating
715 if (Opp_hist(end) == ...
Defect)&&(My_hist(end)==Cooperate)
716 %this means unprovoked defection
717 %I have to start retaliating
718 move = Defect;
719 Moves_to_retaliate = Retaliation_Counter;
720 %how many more moves I have to retaliate
721 Retaliation_Counter = Retaliation_Counter ...
+ 1;
722 %next time I will retaliate one
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723 %move longer
724 else
725 move = Cooperate;
726 end;
727 end;
728 end;
729 end;
730 end
731 %
732
733 %%Sample Play
734
735 function [hist1, hist2]=SamplePlay(Strat1,Strat2, n_of_moves)
736 % produces two histories for a game of n_of_moves rounds
737 %of strategy Strat1 playing against strategy Strat2
738
739 aux_hist1=[]; %initialize auxiliary histories
740 aux_hist2=[]; %initialize auxiliary histories
741 for round=1:n_of_moves
742 move1 = strategy{Strat1}(aux_hist1, aux_hist2);
743 %move for player 1
744 move2 = strategy{Strat2}(aux_hist2, aux_hist1);
745 %move for player 2
746 aux_hist1 = [aux_hist1, move1];
747 %update history of player 1
748 aux_hist2 = [aux_hist2, move2];
749 %update history of player 2
750 end;
751 hist1 = aux_hist1;
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752 hist2 = aux_hist2;
753 end
754
755
756 %% Actual tournament (round robin)
757
758 function [score1, score2]=Axelrod(Strat1,Strat2, n_of_moves)
759 % produces two histories for a game of n_of_moves rounds
760 % of strategy Strat1 playing against strategy Strat2
761 % also produces two scores from a game of n_of_moves rounds
762
763 aux_hist1=[]; %initialize auxiliary histories
764 aux_hist2=[]; %initialize auxiliary histories
765 P1score = 0; %initialize player 1 score
766 P2score = 0; %initialize player 2 score
767 for round=1:n_of_moves
768 move1 = strategy{Strat1}(aux_hist1, aux_hist2);
769 %move for player 1
770 move2 = strategy{Strat2}(aux_hist2, aux_hist1);
771 %move for player 2
772 aux_hist1 = [aux_hist1, move1];
773 %update history of player 1
774 aux_hist2 = [aux_hist2, move2];
775 %update history of player 2
776 P1score = P1score + PD_payoff(move1, move2);
777 %update score of player 1
778 P2score = P2score + PD_payoff(move2, move1);
779 %update score of player 2
780 end;
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781 score1 = P1score;
782 score2 = P2score;
783 end
784
785 %%Display Outcomes from Actual Axelrod Tournament
786
787 for k = 1:1000 %play the tournament 100 times
788 display(['playing round ' num2str(k)])
789 for Strat1 = 1:15 % all players will play
790 for Strat2 = Strat1:15 % with every other player
791 [score1, score2]=Axelrod(Strat1, Strat2, 200);
792 SCORES_OUTPUT(Strat1, Strat2) = score1;
793 SCORES_OUTPUT(Strat2, Strat1) = score2;
794 end
795 SCORES_OUTPUT(Strat1, 16) = mean(SCORES_OUTPUT(Strat1, ...
1:15));
796 end
797
798
799 total_scores = SCORES_OUTPUT(:, 16);
800
801 [¬, indices] = sort(total_scores, 'descend');
802
803
804 %AUTOMATICALLY INCLUDE THE ORDER
805 for ii=1:15
806 SCORES_OUTPUT(indices(ii),17) = ii;
807 end
808
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809 %this is for number outputs only
810 xlswrite('number_outputfile', SCORES_OUTPUT, k);
811
812 %uncomment the things below for getting nice tables
813 % SCORES_TO_WRITE(2:16, 2:18) = SCORES_OUTPUT;
814 % xlswrite('outputfile', SCORES_TO_WRITE, k);
815 % TABLE(1, 2:16) = strategy_names;
816 % TABLE(1, 17:18) = {'Average', 'Order'};
817 % xlswrite('outputfile', TABLE, k);
818 % TABLE2(2:16,1) = strategy_names;
819 % xlswrite('outputfile', TABLE2, k);
820
821 end
822 end
A.2 Matlab Code for Data Analysis for Tournament
1 function data_analysis
2 %reads outputs generated by IPD Axelrod Tournament and
3 %analyzes it.
4 %It collects the best, worst, and average scores from each
5 %of the sheets in the outputfile from the IPD_Tournament.
6
7 strategy_names = {'TFT', 'Tideman', 'Nydegger', 'Grofman', ...
'Shubik', 'Stein', 'Grim', 'Davis', 'Graaskamp', 'Downing', ...
'Feld', 'Joss', 'Tullock', 'Unnamed' 'Random'};
8
9
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10 number_of_sheets = 1000;
11 %read the output file into one single variable
12 for sheet=1:number_of_sheets
13 display(['now reading sheet ' num2str(sheet)])
14 output(:,:,sheet) = xlsread('outputfile.xls',sheet);
15 end
16
17
18 for row = 1:15
19 for column = 1:17
20 aux = output(row,column,:);
21 if column <17
22 best_score(row,column) = max(aux);
23 %looking for the maximum score
24 worst_score(row,column) = min(aux);
25 %looking for the minimum score
26 average_score(row,column) = mean(aux);
27 %looking for the average score
28 else
29 best_score(row,column) = min(aux);
30 %looking for the highest place
31 worst_score(row,column) = max(aux);
32 %looking for the lowest place
33 average_score(row,column) = mean(aux);
34 %looking for the minimum score
35 end
36 end
37 end
38
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39
40 function write_it_nicely(input, filename)
41 %writes input matrix into a nice table with the headings
42 %into the specified file
43 TO_WRITE(2:16, 2:18) = input;
44 xlswrite(filename, TO_WRITE);
45 TABLE(1, 2:16) = strategy_names;
46 TABLE(1, 17:18) = {'Average', 'Order'};
47 xlswrite(filename, TABLE);
48 TABLE2(2:16,1) = strategy_names;
49 xlswrite(filename, TABLE2);
50 end
51
52 write_it_nicely(best_score,'best.xls')
53 write_it_nicely(worst_score,'worst.xls')
54 write_it_nicely(average_score,'average.xls')
55 end
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APPENDIX B
DESCRIPTIONS OF STRATEGIES IN AXELROD’S TOURNAMENT
Here we include a description of each of the strategies that competed in
Axelrod’s original computer tournament. Any variations that were implemented in
our computer tournament are also indicated in the description. The descriptions
listed here were compiled using information in the Axelrod Library [KCH+17].
(1) TIT FOR TAT. Always cooperates on the first move. After the first move, it
reciprocates the opponent’s last move.
(2) TIDEMAN. It plays the Shubik Strategy with a slight variation. The
opponent is given a "fresh start" if certain criteria are met:
(a) The opponent is 10 points behind this strategy
(b) AND if the opponent has not just begun a run of defections
(c) AND if it has been at least 20 rounds since the last "fresh start"
(d) AND there are 10 or more rounds left in the tournament
(e) AND the total number of defections differs from a 50-50 random sample
by at least 3.0 standard deviations.
A "fresh start" is a sequence of 2 cooperations and an assumption that the
game has just started (so all is forgotten).
(3) NYDEGGER. Plays a variation of TFT for 3 rounds: if it is the only one to
cooperate on first round, and only one to defect on second round, then then it
defects on round 3. After first 3 moves, the following moves are based on the
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previous 3 rounds based on a score given by making a calculation:
A = 16a1 + 4a2 + a3, where ai is the score for the previous ith round:
(a) ai = 3 if both strategies defect.
(b) ai = 2 if only the opponent defects.
(c) ai = 1 if only it defects.
The strategy defects if and only if A = {1, 6, 7, 17, 22, 23, 26, 29, 30, 31,
33,38, 39, 45, 49, 54, 55, 58, 61}.
(4) GROFMAN. It cooperates on the first two moves, and then returns the
opponent’s moves for the next five moves (i.e. It cooperates on the first move
and then plays TFT for moves 2-6). For the remaining moves of the game, it
cooperates if both it and the opponent made the same move in the previous
round. Otherwise, it cooperates randomly with a probability of 2/7.
(5) SHUBIK. Plays a variation of TFT. It cooperates when the opponent
cooperates, and it begins with a single defection if the opponent defects.
But,the retaliation increases by 1 each time the opponent defects when it had
cooperated on the previous round.
(6) STEIN & RAPOPORT. This strategy plays a modification of TIT FOR
TAT. It cooperates for first 4 moves, then plays TFT, checking every 15 moves
to see if the opponent is playing randomly. If the opponent is playing
randomly, it defects. Otherwise, it cooperates. Finally, it defects on last 2
moves.
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(7) FRIEDMAN. This strategy will cooperate until the opponent defects. Then,
it will always defect for all of the remaining moves.
(8) DAVIS. This strategy cooperates on the first 10 moves, then it plays
FRIEDMAN for the remaining moves of the game.
(9) GRAASKAMP. Plays TFT for 50 rounds, defects on round 51, plays TFT
for rounds 52-56, a check is then made to see if the opponent is playing
randomly, if so it defects for the rest of the rounds. The strategy also checks to
see if the opponent is playing some other strategy that it recognizes. If so, it
plays TFT for the remaining moves of the game.Otherwise, if the opponent is
not playing a recognizable strategy, it cooperates and randomly defects every 5
to 15 moves. The last bit is coded by randomly defecting with probability 0.1.
(10) DOWNING. In the original tournament, DOWNING defected on the first
two moves. This is corrected and we implement the REVISED DOWNING
strategy. It calculates the conditional probability that the opponent will
cooperate given that it defected and the conditional probability that the
opponent will cooperate given that it cooperated. If the opponent seems
unresponsive to what it is doing, it will defect as much as possible. If the
opponent seems responsive, it cooperates. It uses these probabilities to
estimate the opponent’s next move. These probabilities are continuously
updated and the strategy attempts to make moves that will maximize the
score on the long term.
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(11) FELD. This strategy plays TFT in that it begins with a cooperation and
defects every time the opponent defects, but it cooperates with a decreasing
probability until it reaches 0.5. We decrease the probability each time by 0.05.
(12) JOSS. It plays a variation of TFT. It always defects when the opponent
defects, but it cooperates when the opponent cooperates with a probability of
.9.
(13) TULLOCK. Cooperates the first 11 rounds, and then randomly cooperates
10% less than the opponent cooperated in the previous 10 rounds.
(14) UNNAMED. It cooperates with a given probability P. This probability is
initially 0.3. Then P is updated every 10 rounds based on whether the
opponent seems very random, very cooperative, or very uncooperative. Also,
after 130 rounds, P is adjusted if it is losing to the opponent. The original
code is not available, and has been deemed "complicated," but based on
public descriptions, it can be determined that this strategy cooperates with a
random probability between 0.3 and 0.7.
(15) RANDOM. Cooperates and defects on a completely random basis–not
dependent on the opponent’s moves.
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